How Much Bigger Can the World Cup Become?
The men’s World Cup expanded from 24 teams to 32 in 1998 and to 48 in 2026. In 2025, FIFA acknowledged a proposal to analyse a one-off 64-team edition for the tournament’s centenary in 2030.
The proposal remains a proposal. But it reveals the commercial logic that has shaped the competition for decades: when growth becomes harder to find within the existing product, make the product larger.
What a 64-team format would add
A conventional design would place 64 teams into 16 groups of four, followed by a 32-team knockout phase. That produces 128 matches — 24 more than the 104-match 2026 format and exactly twice the 64 games played in Qatar.
The arithmetic is attractive. Twenty-four additional fixtures mean more broadcast hours, tickets, hospitality sessions, sponsor exposure and digital content. The format is also cleaner than the 48-team structure: two teams could advance from every group, avoiding the complex ranking of third-placed sides.
Expansion would broaden representation and make qualification more plausible for countries that rarely reach the finals. The commercial upside could be particularly large if major consumer markets such as China or India qualified. But expansion only increases the probability of their participation; it does not guarantee it.
A revenue scenario, not a forecast
FIFA has approved a $14bn revenue budget for the 2027–30 cycle under the currently planned 48-team World Cup. TSL’s illustrative 64-team scenario places cycle revenue at roughly $15.0bn–$15.8bn.
The range is built from three assumptions. First, the match count rises by 23%, from 104 to 128. Second, only part of FIFA’s revenue is directly sensitive to match inventory: television, sponsorship and hospitality packages are sold as bundles, not priced match by match. Third, the additional fixtures are given a lower average commercial value than existing games, because early group matches involving lower-ranked teams are unlikely to command the same audience or ticket yield as knockout fixtures.
The model therefore assumes an incremental uplift of about $1.0bn–$1.8bn rather than applying the full 23% match increase to all $14bn of cycle revenue. It is an analytical range, not a FIFA projection.
This matters because the frequently repeated logic — 23% more matches equals 23% more revenue — is economically weak. Supply can be counted. Demand has to be earned.
Growth is becoming harder to find
FIFA has already monetised much of the existing tournament through higher ticket prices, larger sponsorship programmes, new hospitality products and longer commercial windows.
The 2026 World Cup also introduced mandatory three-minute hydration breaks in the 22nd and 67th minutes of every match. FIFA said the breaks were implemented for player welfare and generated no additional revenue for the organisation because commercial contracts had been signed in advance. Yet the pauses create predictable windows that broadcasters can monetise, and future rights packages may price that inventory more explicitly.
This illustrates the broader point. Mature sports properties search for incremental yield inside the product: another sponsor tier, a premium seat, a digital collectible, a longer broadcast or a new tournament. When those levers face resistance or diminishing returns, adding fixtures becomes the most visible remaining source of inventory.
More games are not automatically more valuable
A larger World Cup could weaken the assumptions on which the revenue case depends.
Audience growth may not keep pace with match growth. Broadcasters may pay more for the total package but less per fixture. Sponsors may receive more exposure while each appearance becomes less distinctive. Host countries would need to absorb additional security, transport and venue costs. Domestic calendars and player workloads would face further pressure.
Tournament design presents another problem. Academic work on a 64-team format suggests that simply scaling the traditional group-and-knockout architecture can increase matches with little competitive relevance and reduce the proportion of fixtures between leading teams. More inventory can therefore lower average quality.
The World Cup’s value is partly a scarcity premium. Qualification is difficult, the best teams meet infrequently and each edition feels consequential. Expansion creates access and revenue, but it also changes the product being sold.
The economic question is not whether a 64-team World Cup would make more money. It probably would. The question is whether the extra revenue would exceed the additional cost, complexity and dilution — and whether each new match would be worth less than the one before it.
RESEARCH NOTE — INTERPRETATION AND ASSUMPTIONS TSL scenario: $15.0bn–$15.8bn of 2027–30 cycle revenue under a 64-team World Cup. Baseline: FIFA’s official $14bn budget. Match inventory: +23%. We apply the uplift only to match-sensitive revenue and discount the marginal fixtures for lower average commercial value. The range is illustrative, not an official forecast.
Sources and methodology
• Reuters — FIFA to consider a one-off 64-team World Cup
• FIFA — 2026 format: 48 teams and 104 matches
• FIFA Council — $14bn 2027–30 revenue budget
• FIFA — mandatory hydration breaks and commercial clarification
• Rennó-Costa — Double elimination formats for a 64-team FIFA World Cup